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I want to indulge in a thoroughly un-American activity: namely looking
backwards. Perhaps on the Silver Jubilee of BLS, I may be forgiven. It is just over
thirty years ago that Paul Grice delivered the William James Lectures, in which he
outlined the theory of implicature, and then set up shop on this campus. It is
almost 25 years since ‘Logic and conversation’ first appeared in print, and exactly
10 years ago that the book Studies in the Way of Words was published, where
many of Grice’s famous unpublications finally appeared.
On this anniversary, it seems appropriate to ask: How can the implicature ideas be
applied in current language description and analysis? Gricean analyses are usually
proposed for familiar languages for obvious reasons: subtle judgements of
meaning are often involved. However, it may be possible to push beyond this if
we concentrate on a certain genus of implicature, namely Generalized
Conversational Implicature, and construe this in certain ways. In this paper I want
first to sketch such a construal, and then to show that this may be a practical tool
for understanding patterns in less familiar languages, which may also help us to
capture patterns of preferred interpretation. For this purpose I will concentrate (for
no special reason other than to justify the title) on spatial description in the
language of Rossel Island, with comparisons to other languages we have been
working on in a collaborative project at the Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics.
I suspect that there are some who think that Grice’s theory of implicature is passé.
Many cognitive linguists (e.g. Jackendoff 1983, Langacker 1987) deny that there
is any place for a semantics/pragmatics distinction in their conception of the field
(although in practice the distinction is recognized in other terms; see Wilkins &
Hill 1995, Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996). Perhaps they have the following
syllogism in mind: Anything we mean, we think; Therefore, what we mean and
what we think are the very same thing - ‘semantic structures’ just are ‘conceptual
structures’. We don’t need to be a psycholinguist to see that this is confused.
There are a number of properties of language that ensure that what we think and
what we say could never be exactly coincident (Levinson 1997):
 There is more than one ‘language of thought’, and language is tied to a more
propositional mode of representation: that’s why you can accurately describe
in one word your kin-relation to your Auntie, but in any number of words fail
to describe her face.
 Language is a linear medium. There is no reason to think that, say, visual
cognition is linear in the same way (e.g. the cognitive power of diagrams lies
in their non-linearity). 
 Language is indexical. But thought better not be indexical in the same way, or
a mental resolution to do something tomorrow would ensure I never did it. 
2 Language is general, thought specific. Natural lexica have to be learnable, and
so are small in size: this guarantees the semantic generality of expressions –
they must cover a lot of different extensions.
 Language is a public, broadcast medium. So it employs special shortcuts, like
ellipses and anaphora, but also builds in redundancies against “noise” (like
agreement systems)
 There is often an obvious gap between the ‘said’ and the ‘unsaid’. That is the
domain of pragmatics.
For the purposes of making vivid the distinction between what is coded and what
is inferred, a visual analogy may be helpful. Consider a sketch like that in (1)
below. We can effortlessly interpret this as a mother and child. But there is almost
nothing there! How do we do it? Although we know much more about the
processes underlying vision (thanks partly to animal models) than those
underlying language, how we get from an image as “degraded” as this Matisse
sketch to a determinate interpretation is pretty mysterious. Something like the
following must be involved: 
1. We imaginatively fill in missing lines, complete arcs, in order to obtain a
“finished” 2D line drawing.
2. We extract 3D volumes from 2D representations.
3. We can do all this only because we can exploit the presumption of semiosis –
that is, the presumption that the artist depicted something in such a way that he
intended us to be able to recover it, following the cultural conventions of
drawing in our society (and not e.g. those in Central Australia, where the view
is always from above). 
(1) Matisse Sketch
Now compare some minimal utterance like: “It will be ready soon”. In a similar
way we have to complete the sketch (and the resolution can go in quite different
directions, according to whether we are talking about the dinner or Joe’s
dissertation):
1. We fill in the ellipses (ready for what?), we resolve the pronouns (it = dinner,
or thesis), we limit the temporal spans (will soon = 5 minutes, or next year)
32. We extract full-blown interpretations (ready of dinner means cooked, ready of
dissertations means written), utilizing all the conventions of language use, our
knowledge of stereotypical scenarios or frames, and so on.
3. We can do all this because we can exploit the presumption of semiosis –
knowing that the speaker said just enough for us to be able to recover what he
or she intended, using the conventions of the language and its use.
On this view, language codes only highly schematic and incomplete meanings.
The illusion of determinate messages is due to a huge body of inference triggered
by those feeble cues that constitute linguistic meaning. In short, language is
sketchy. Why should that be? One crucial motivation is that human language is
encumbered with a striking bottleneck in speech production: The fastest
sustainable speech rate for English is about 7 syllables per second, or 17.5
segments per second (Laver 1994), which equates to a very lowly 100 BAUD.
(Bill Poser, p.c.). Pre-articulation processes in speech production can run three to
four times faster than articulation (Wheeldon & Levelt 1995), and the same goes
for comprehension (Mehler et al. 1993). This encoding bottleneck implies that
linguistic coding is ‘expensive’ and inference is ‘cheap’, and the design
requirements for human communication are: minimize linguistic coding and
maximize inference. 
What is required is some system of ampliative inference, a reasoning process that
adds premises (not deduction or logical inference which merely cranks out what is
already contained in an utterance - which, as we have seen, may anyway be
propositionally incomplete and fragmentary). The process should increase what
Bar-Hillel & Carnap called the semantic informativeness of the utterance, i.e. it
should serve to further delimit the worlds compatible with what the utterance
means – an assertion is informative to the extent that it tells us what is not the
case.
The problem is: how to constrain such ampliative inference, so that what the
recipient interprets corresponds well enough to what the speaker intends? The
only way is for speaker and recipient to share simple but powerful heuristics,
which will multiply the content of what is coded in a reliably recoverable way.
Particularly desirable would be heuristics which would amplify the content of the
message without requiring extensive background knowledge, because then an
utterance could carry with itself, as it were, the keys to its own interpretation, its
own unZip code. 
Here are some candidates. First, consider a blocks world (à la Winograd 1972): a
domain of discourse which consists of a few coloured blocks, say a red cube, a
blue cylinder, a green cylinder, a small yellow cube, and a couple of other blocks.
Now consider the utterance:
(2)  “The blue cylinder is on the red cube”
The statement is compatible with many different possibilities in the blocks world,
e.g. the blue cylinder and the yellow cube and the green cylinder are all on the red
cube. But that is not how we interpret the utterance: we read it as a claim that only
the blue cylinder is on the red cube. That is the effect of our first heuristic, which I
shall call the Q-heuristic – loosely put it goes “What is saliently not said is not
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ones, and other blocks of other color – they weren’t mentioned, so they were not
in play. 
Now consider the same utterance from a different perspective. When we
envisaged the blue cylinder on the red cube, we imagined it sitting canonically on
the red cube, not teetering on the edge, nor with another block between it and the
red cube. Nor do we expect the red cube itself to be perched precariously on
another block. There would be nothing false about describing any of these
situations using utterance (2) (e.g. we don’t hesitate to say “Supper is on the
table” just because there is a table-cloth between the supper and the table). But (2)
is just not how we would describe those non-stereotypical situations. That’s
because we observe what we can call the I-heuristic, which, loosely put, goes
“What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified”. 
Now if we did want to describe those non-canonical situations we might say, e.g.,
(3) “The blue cylinder is supported by the red cube”
or “The blue cylinder is sort of on      the red cube”
“The blue cylinder is on top  of      the red cube”
In doing so we would be following the M-heuristic, roughly “Marked message
indicates marked situation”. 
Now these heuristics are just some of Grice’s Maxims in disguise. But recasting
them this way is not entirely gratuitous. What we are trying to capture is that just
some of those Maxims are suitable for the job of producing default inferences.
Default inferences are ones that go through unless blocked in some way. Grice
called them Generalized conversational implicatures, or GCIs for short, and he
was particularly interested in them because GCIs are – he thought – frequently
confused with the meanings or semantical content of words and constructions, for
the simple reason that they normally, unless cancelled in some way, accompany
those expressions. They thus do not depend on special properties of the context,
like implicatures due to the maxim of relevance, or figures of speech like irony.
Now the heuristics that I have just outlined have the requisite property of inducing
default inferences, because they are based solely on properties of the form and
content of the utterance, not on extra propositions about the context. The Q-
heuristic requires a metalinguistic notion of salient alternates, an attention to what
else might have been said but wasn’t. The I-heuristic licenses maximal
interpretations to the stereotype on the basis of unmarked message type. The M-
heuristic plays off the I-heuristic: whatever might have been implicated by a
simple unmarked utterance, is ruled out by the use of a marked message form. 
Because these heuristics are just some of the old familiar Maxims in disguise, we
do not need to spell out all the details of all the inferences that can be obtained
under each one here (see the outline in Levinson 1995, and the monographic
treatment in Levinson 1999). But here are some reminders, with some
applications to spatial prepositions sketched:
The Q-Principle (from Grice’s First Maxim of Quantity, “Make your
contribution as informative as is required”).
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For a set of alternates in the same semantic field which are logically compatible,
use of the one implicates that another doesn’t apply (e.g. asserting “The ball is
red” implicates ‘not yellow, blue, etc. as well’). More specifically, given a Horn-
scale <S, W> where S is informationally stronger than W (so A(S) entails A(W)
in a suitable sentence-frame A) , using W implicates that the stronger S does not
apply. For example, <All, some> form such a scale, so that asserting “Some of
Grice’s pirots are still alive” +> (implicates) ‘not all of them are’, and similarly
for all the quantifiers and modals (see Horn 1989, Levinson 1999). Closed-class
alternates frequently exhibit this kind of privative opposition (cf. e.g. Hawkins
1991 on determiners), as do contrasts in the lexicon (cf. e.g. Wilkins & Hill on
motion verbs). Consider for example the English spatial prepositions: arguably,
for instance, <at, near> form a scale, so “the train is near the station” only
implicates ‘not at the station’. 
The I-Principle (for ‘Informativeness-Principle’ (Atlas & Levinson 1981), from
Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity, “Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required”).
Heuristic: ‘Unmarked, minimal expressions warrant maximal interpretations to
the stereotypical extensions.’
Under this heuristic fall the many systematic patterns whereby simple expressions
get maximal interpretations. Consider e.g. conjunction-buttressing in which
conjoined events get read (under appropriate tense/aspect constraints) as causal
statements (“She pushed the button and the engine started” +> ‘she caused the
engine to start’), or the rich interpretations of possessives or novel compounds
(Levinson 1999), or the many kinds of negative-strengthening (Horn 1989).
Again, we can find examples in the domain of spatial prepositions: for example in
is interpreted in accord with the most salient stereotypes, thus asserting “The
coffee is in the cup” +> ‘the liquid, rather than the beans, is wholly within the
cup’, while “The pencil is in the cup” +> ‘partially in, but projecting out of the
cup’, and so on. 
The M-Principle (from Grice’s first and fourth Maxims of Manner, “Avoid
obscurity, avoid prolixity”).
Heuristic: Marked message indicates marked situation; specifically, if unmarked
utterance U I-implicates p, then marked utterance M M-implicates the
complement of p (Horn’s 1984 ‘division of pragmatic labor’).
The effect of the M-heuristic is, then, to give us mirror-image inferences:
whatever one would have inferred by the I-principle from a simple, direct
expression, is ruled out by the use of a marked, prolix or unusual expression.
Consider, for example, the periphrastic modals: whereas saying “John could solve
the problem” I-implicates ‘he did’, saying the more marked “John had the ability
to solve the problem” M-implicates ‘he didn’t’. Similarly, the use of double
negatives to indicate a positive suggests that the implicatures of the simple
positive are being avoided. Thus whereas “It’s possible the Republicans will win
the next election” I-implicates ‘likely to probability n’ (where n is given by
stereotypical expectations), “It’s not impossible that the Republicans will win the
next election”, M-implicates that the probability is significantly less than n. There
are many other applications to marked lexical alternates, marked derivational
forms, etc. (see Horn 1984, Levinson 1999). Again, examples can be found in the
English spatial prepositions, where e.g. on contrasts with on top of , so that “The
6lamp is on top of the desk” M-implicates either an unusual viewing angle (we are
under the desk) or a deviation from the direct-contact that would have been
suggested by on. 
We have now outlined three Gricean heuristics. They induce presumptive
meanings, that is default inferences that are generated without elaborate
reasoning about the speaker’s intentions. GCIs gain this presumptive quality, this
generality across contexts, because they are based on general heuristics operating
only on the form and content of what has been said. Utterances carry with them
the systematic cues to their own unpacking, thus overcoming the encoding
bottleneck by letting metalinguistic considerations about choices in message
construction amplify the message. More simply put, the three heuristics suggest
an iconic basis for message amplification. This idea is entirely in line with Grice’s
central idea about communication, namely that “every artificial or non-iconic
system is founded upon an antecedent iconic system” of representation and
communication (Grice 1989:358).
2.0 Yélî Dnye, the language of Rossel Island
Let us now turn to consider how such an analysis of presumptive meanings might
be of practical application in linguistic analysis. For that purpose I propose to
transport Grice to a pacific island, in line with his philosophical hedonism (as
explained in the Grandy & Warner (1986) Festschrift). Let us look at a few
aspects of spatial description in Yélî Dnye, the language-isolate spoken on Rossel
island, Papua New Guinea (see Henderson 1995, whose practical orthography is
used here). In so doing I will try and draw out some generalizations that seem to
be applicable to other languages under study at the Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics.
For comparative purposes, we employ a number of stimulus materials. One of
them is a picture book (designed by Melissa Bowerman and Eric Pederson) with
71 pictures of objects in a ‘topological’ relation to one another, i.e. relations
describable in English with prepositions like in, on, at, near. We ask, e.g. “where
is the cup?”, and get the answer “The cup is on the table”, the latter exemplifying
what we will call the Basic Locative Construction for English. When we do this
for the 71 pictures, for English we get about fifteen prepositions (about a third of
which are compound, like on top of ) and one verb, for Dutch we get about 20
prepositions (about a third compound) and four verbs, and for Rossel language we
get about 25 simplex postpositions and three verbs. For Tzeltal we get one
preposition and up to forty verbs. Clearly, these are fine classifications of locative
situations, but they may be done either in the adpositions, or in the locative verbs
or in both (not to mention other spatial nominals). 
The ‘basic locative construction’ for Rossel is exemplified in (4): 
(4) Figure Ground Postposition Positional verb
 
 kémi  kîgha kapî k:oo ka tóó
  mango fruit cup in deictic+TAMP sits
  ‘The ripe mango is in the cup’ (or ‘There is a mango in the cup’)
7This construction has two important components: the postposition which builds
the postpositional phrase specifying the Ground (where the object is located), and
the positional verb which is largely determined by the Figure (the thing to be
located). We take these up in turn. 
Rosselian postpositions
We have already seen how the oppositions between the English spatial
prepositions may be susceptible to a Gricean analysis: thus <at, near> may form a
Horn-scale, with the corresponding Q-implicatures, while in and on engender I-
implicatures to the stereotype, which can in turn be avoided by the use of more
prolix forms, so that e.g. “The cup is on top of the table” M-implicates some
deviation from the stereotypical disposition, or from the canonical viewing
situation (e.g. we are under the table). 
Let’s now look at the Rossel postpositions, which in our sample seem to make a
record number of distinctions. Is it possible, without good intuitions about the
language to formulate hypotheses about likely implicatural relations between the
postpositions? Using our picture book, we got four consultants to describe each
situation or its nearest Rosselian analogue, and as mentioned we obtained 25
distinct postpositions. Let us look at those which seem to indicate that the figure is
attached to the ground, i.e. they were used to describe what we may call
attachment scenes. These are scenes that in English would mostly involve the
preposition on, as in painting on wall, ring on finger, handle on door, bandaid on
leg, papers on spike, etc. Many kinds of attachment scenes will in fact be
described in other terms: e.g. leaves on a branch, or fruit on a tree invoke a
postposition nkwodo which emphasizes ‘distribution of multiple Figures all over
Ground’. Factoring these sorts of cases out, we have the following central
attachment postpositions:
Postposition Gloss Hypothesized Semantic Conditions
paa ‘on a vertical surface’ Figure is attached to (near) vertical surface
‘nedê ‘stuck on hook/spike’ Figure is attached by projecting,
piercing part of Ground (hook, spike, etc.)
p:uu   ‘stuck on’ Figure is attached strongly to ground,
regardless of type of fixing
The glosses have been derived by inspection of the dozen or more scenes
described with each postposition. Inspection also shows that ‘nedê (used for 10
pictures) and p:uu (used for 29) have overlapping extensions: 7 pictures had
alternate descriptions with one or the other postposition. This suggests that ‘nedê
and p:uu might be in privative opposition, forming a Horn-scale <‘nedê, p:uu>,
such that ‘nedê basically means the same as p:uu but with the additional
specification of attachment by piercing/hooking, schematically:
<‘nedê,  p:uu> 
Strong Weak
‘attached by ‘attached somehow’
hook or spike’
If so, every ‘nedê-situation is also in principle a p:uu-situation, although by our
Q-heuristic speakers should use the more informative ‘nedê if they can. 
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we have three scenes and three consultants, and two forms S and W which are
hypothesized to form a Horn-scale <S, W>. Here is the behavioral distribution of
responses predicted by the Gricean heuristic of using the strongest applicable
form:
Scenes Consultants Non-occurring 
1 2 3 patterns
S-applicable Scene: 1st choice S S S W
2nd choice W W W S
Marginal S-scene: 1st choice S W W W
2nd choice W   _   _ S
W-only Scene: 1st choice W W W S
2nd choice   _   _   _ S
In short, the predictions are that:
(i) For every S-applicable scene, consultants if pressed may agree that such scenes
could be described with W, since there is only a pragmatic constraint behind the
resistance to the use of W. And we don’t expect them to offer us a W-description
as first choice, then an S-description as a second best.
(ii) For every marginal S-applicable scene, we expect some consultants to choose
S and some W as the best description, but if they choose S, they should freely
consider W an alternate.
(iii) For every W-applicable scene for which S seems inappropriate, we do not
expect a similar willingness to back off to an S-description, because this is a firm
semantic constraint.
Now consider the distribution of responses for our 4 consultants over a
representative sample of ’nedê and p:uu scenes:
Picture No. Scene ’nedê  p:uu
22 papers on spike 4 0
70 apple on skewer 4 0
9 coat on hook 3 1
37 clothes pegged on line 2 2
57 pendant on chain 1 3
12 mud on knife 0 4
35 bandaid on leg 0 4
It is evident that all four consultants use ‘nedê for clear spiking-scenes (pictures
22, 70), and all four use p:uu for scenes involving adhesion (12, 35). Most
consultants treat hooking as a ‘nedê case (picture 9), most treat a chain-link
attachment (picture 57) as a p:uu case. Right in the middle is an equivocal scene,
in which clothes are held on a line by grip-action pegs: here the consultants
divide. Let’s look in detail at their responses for this marginal scene:
9Clothes on Line Scene (Picture 57):
Consultants: 1 2 3 4
First choice: ‘nedê ‘nede p:uu p:uu
Second choice: p:uu p:uu _ _
Clearly, the behavior is in line with the Horn-scale prediction: in the marginal
case, anyone who volunteers ‘nedê as best description will readily accept p:uu,
but not vice-versa. Thus we have some initial evidence in favour of the Horn-scale
analysis.
Exactly similar analyses are possible for other pairs of Rossel adpositions, for
example different IN postpositions, where one (u mênê) requires full inclusion
under convex closure of the ground, and the other (k:oo) allows partial inclusion.
Again the behavioral distribution of response types fits a scalar analysis. So what?
The general point is that many expressions that functionally contrast may in fact
be in pragmatic rather than semantic opposition. Further, careful examination of
preferred usages can reveal likely pragmatic factors even in a language under field
investigation. 
Now, for some of these attachment scenes, a different construction is also
available. The construction is just the same, with a positional verb, except that the
postposition is dropped altogether. This zero-postposition construction has a
limited but systematic distribution in the description of our picture-book scenes:
for example, instead of p:uu ‘general attachment’, the zero-postposition is used
for part-whole relations (e.g. strap on bag), traditional adornments (e.g.
armbands), objects in characteristic use (e.g. cork in bottle). The generalization is
that the zero-postposition construction cannot be used for unexpected, non-
stereotypical relations. Characteristic motion and dispositions (whether ships on
the sea, or fruit on a branch) invite the dropping of the postposition. Non-
traditional adornments (rings, hats) require post-positions, traditional adornments
(arm-bands, belts) do not. All this is in line with cross-linguistic tendencies. Many
languages with systematic case-marking may oppose a general Locative Case to a
series of adpositions. Thus in Tamil one can use the Locative Case for nearly any
stereotypical extension, without specifying IN/ON or other relations in the rich
postpositional system; to use those postpositions then implicates some kind of
special situation. Similarly, many languages (like Guugu Yimithirr) drop the
locative verb in these kinds of situations, where Rossel drops the postposition.
What these reduced constructions signal is: business as usual. They are
constructions inducing I-inferences to the stereotype, and they can contrast
minimally with the postpositional construction, which can then suggest an
unusual, non-stereotypical extension by M-implicature. This explains why our
Rossel informants are happy to use the zero-postpositional construction with
traditional bodily adornments, like armbands, but resistant to using it with
Western adornments like watches, rings or metal necklaces. 
There are a number of competing ON-postpositions about which similar remarks
can be made. Take the following contrasting sentences describing a headband
around a man’s head: 
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 (5)Picture 46: Head band
(a) kpîdî pee pi kêpa mbêmê ka t:a
 cloth piece person forehead on  TAMP hanging
 ‘The piece of cloth is hanging on the person’s forehead’
(b) kpîdî pee pi   kêpa  ___________________ka t:a
  cloth piece person forehead (Postposition slot) TAMP hanging
 ‘The piece of cloth is hanging (around) the person’s forehead’
(c) kpîdî pee _______________ mbêmê ka t:a
  cloth piece (Ground slot ) on TAMP hanging
 ‘The piece of cloth is hanging on’
(d) kpîdî pee  pi kêpa mbêmê ka tóó
  cloth piece person forehead on   TAMP sitting
‘The piece of cloth is sitting on the person’s forehead’
The sentence (b) was the preferred form: it says just what needs to be said for an
accurate description, and thus I-implicates stereotypical extensions. The first
sentence (a) is prolix compared to (b): the postposition mbêmê therefore M-
implicates that the head-band isn’t around the hat-line, but is perched on top of the
head. That implicature is avoided by an alternative reduction as in (c), where the
Ground object (the head) is omitted but the ON postposition maintained, as in
English He’s got a hat on. Finally, one can switch the positional verb to another
of the alternates as in (d): once again, the message now is “non-stereotypical
extensions”, specifically here what is suggested is that the head-band is not firmly
tied on. This brings us to the next subject: locative verbs, but first let us sum up.
We have now illustrated how the three kinds of implicature, Q-, I- and M-, may
serve to further structure this closed-class set of postpositions: many Saussurean
contrasts are not there in the semantics at all (e.g. the extensions of one term
include those of another), but rather emerge by the operations of Q-implicature or
M-implicature. We have also shown how hypotheses about implicatural relations
can be derived by inspection of elicitation materials in a field language, allowing
them to be checked in further elicitation.
Positional Verbs
In answer to Where-questions, a language with a single locative verb like English
poses no problems of choice. But a language (like Dutch or Arrernte or Rossel)
with three or more contrasting positional verbs forces a choice on complex
semantic grounds. These verbs are often drawn from those used for human
posture, like ‘sit’, ‘stand’, ‘lie’, but they often include a less anthropomorphic
prototype, ‘hang’. Dutch has all four, Arrernte ‘sit’, ‘stand’, ‘lie’, and Rossel has
‘sit’, ‘stand’, ‘hang’. As far as I know, there is no full-scale study of the cross-
linguistic patterns (although see Clark 1978, Hengeveld 1992:238-9): Stassen
(1997:61) states that the “vast majority” of the 410 languages in his sample
encode dispositional notions in their locatives, and suggests that this is the reason
that locatives are more likely to involve a verb than, say, equational sentences.
David Wilkins (in unpublished work) suggests that languages fall into three main
classes: those with a single locative verb (e.g. English, Oluta, Turkish), those
which utilize a large number of predicates (e.g. Tzeltal, Likpe), and those with a
small contrastive set of positional verbs (e.g. Dutch, Guugu Yimithirr, Rossel).
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The positional verb paradigm in Rossel is as follows (Henderson 1995:32, where
‘proximal’ indicates the three of the six tenses nearest to coding time):
‘sit’ ‘stand’ ‘lie’
Indicative, Proximal Sing/Dual tóó kwo t:a 
Plural pyede wee t:a
Non-Indicative, non-Proximal Sing/Dual/ Pl ya kwo t:a
 
These verbs, with suppletion on these particular dimensions, seem to constitute a
minor form class (there is one other candidate, mii ‘move’, which can be used for
locatives statements about animates moving in their prototypical medium). We
will call these positional verbs because canonical position and disposition of the
Figure constitute, in the prototypical case, the basis of the semantic distinctions.
Let us be clear that languages with a small set of locative verbs like this are
fundamentally different from English in that: (a) Whereas in languages like
English the general copula or BE verb is the unmarked option in answer to a
Where-question, there is no such general option in a positional verb language; (b)
in a language like Dutch or Rossel, when you say “The cup stands on the table”
you are not asserting the standing, you are asserting the location, and presuming
that cups are said to ‘stand’ – your statement will not necessarily be false if the
cup is on its side. Positional-verbs have a sortal nature: they classify the nominal
concepts according to canonical position.
In Rossel the ‘basic locative construction’ is essentially identical to the existential
construction. The alleged differences between existential and locative
constructions can easily be eroded (e.g. existentials can be definite as in There is
only the one God, and localised as There is no food in the house), so it is not
surprising that perhaps a quarter of all languages make no systematic distinction
(E. Clark 1978:94-6). A language with positional locatives already has to have a
default assignment of positional to nominal (otherwise one couldn’t say “The
bottles are on the table” without knowing if they were standing or lying), but this
becomes especially clear in a language like Rossel that collapses locatives and
existentials. In such a language we can use negative existential statements to test
for these defaults (the negative makes clear we can have no particular exemplars
in mind – only collocational constraints can be at work). Applying this negative
existential test for default assignments, we find that in Rossel, we must say in
effect “There is no shell money sitting here”, “There are no islands standing
there”, “There are no canoes hanging there”, etc., as detailed in Appendix 1.
Abstract nouns follow similar conventions: knowledge sits, but memory stands,
and hunger hangs. For physical objects there is some semantic motivation for the
choices here, in line with shape and orientation principles described below. In
addition, a bit of cultural knowledge will help to explain why people sit, but
animals stand, why fornication sits but sorcery hangs, and yams sit in the ground
but taros stand. But there is also almost certainly an element of arbitrary
convention, as in gender and agreement systems, explaining why tides sit, but
currents hang, and so on. 
But what about novel objects? Consultants can agree about how they should be
described. So there must be an underlying system of semantical specification,
which accounts not only for confident assignment of novel objects, but also for
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the (partial) semantic motivation behind the now conventional assignments to
physical objects. Here is my guess at the underlying algorithm:
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 signal ‘general state’ via switch to ‘hang’ (via associations with attachment),
or ‘specific state (right here, now)’ by switch to ‘stand’.
Here are some examples:
(6) koome table u mêknapwo a kwo  tóó
cat table POSS under   TAMP stand sit
‘The cat is under the table’ M+> “Actual position”
(7) te glass u mênê a   kwo tóó
fish bowl POSS inside TAMP stand sit
‘The fish is on the bowl’ M+> “Dead”
 
(8) kpîdî pee pi kêpa mbêmê ka t:a   tóó
  cloth piece person forehead on TAMP hang    sit
 ‘The piece of cloth is around the person’s forehead’    M+>“Falling off”
To summarize: the basic locative construction in Rossel illustrates a number of
general patterns of cross-linguistic validity. First, adpositions are often not strictly
in semantic contrast, the Saussurean oppositions often partly arising from
pragmatic factors (Q- and M-implicatures). Secondly, languages with small sets of
positional verbs typically have the following characteristics: positionals sortally
classify nominal concepts according to conventional collocations and (for
physical objects) shape/position information; these unmarked usages I-implicate
stereotypical extensions; deviations from this unmarked usage can signal various
things by M-implicature. Systematic application of the I-principle can lead to
reduced structures (omissions of adposition or, in some languages, positional),
whereupon fuller structures can M-implicate deviations from expected
stereotypes. From this last fact, the paradox follows that the ‘basic locative
construction’ can in some instances fail to be the most colloquial, least-marked
form of answer to Where-questions. Gricean analyses can help us in practical
linguistic description, and aid the formulation of typological generalizations. 
Conclusion
We have just seen Grice on location on Rossel Island, indulging in some of the
“linguistic botanizing” which he regarded as “essential” (Grice 1986:57). Grice
had learnt that trick from Austin, but unlike Austin he was after a general theory
about the relation of meaning to use: 
“In my own case, a further impetus towards a demand for the provision of a
visible theory underlying ordinary discourse came from my work on the idea of
Conversational Implicature, which emphasized the radical importance of
distinguishing ... what our words say or imply from what we in uttering
them imply: a distinction seemingly denied by Wittgenstein, and all too
frequently ignored by Austin” (ibid., 59, bold added). 
It is a distinction, unfortunately, that we need to be constantly reminded of. And
even if our ambitions are just linguistic description, good linguistic botany
requires that one makes the distinction between what is coded vs. what is not
coded but presumptively inferred, that is between the two great lifeforms in the
theory of meaning: semantics and pragmatics. 
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Appendix 1: Some default assignments of  different Figures to positional predicates under
negative existentials













moon, sun stars red-sky (dawn)
 people, friends, relatives,
descendants, wife, etc.
snakes
chickens, dogs, birds (in
tree), pigs, fish, 
weevils (inside fruit)










pineapples, fruits on trees mangoes, nuts in trees




















smells, light smoke (also ‘stand’)
skin disease cancer disease/epidemic
books cups, candles holes (negative spaces)
eyes, teeth, hair, grey-hair
Some possible underlying cultural logic?
In addition to the canonical position of physical objects,  there seem to be  other factors:
 
 prestige animates ‘sit’ – people, yams,  snakes (sacred), coconuts, betelnuts
 all non-prestige animals ‘stand’ – even fish
 strip-like entities ‘hang’ – hence rivers, paths, tracks of  walkers, canoes
 ‘hanging’ has associations with general condition – hence sorcery and epidemics both ‘hang’,
‘stand’ has associations with temporary condition – hence debts, smells, etc. ‘stand’. 
